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5. China's long march to 
decentralization 
Jorge Martinez-Vazquez1 
INTRODUCTION 
China is a unitary country with a population of around 1.3 billion, an area of 
9.6 million square kilometers, and a public sector organized into five tiers 
of government. Below the central government there are 31 provincial level 
units,2 and below the provinces there are 331 prefectural level units (of 
which 236 are cities), 2109 county-level units (of which 427 are cities), and 
44 741 township-level units. Intergovernmental relations in China are 
organized in a strongly hierarchical fashion, giving the system significant 
federalist features; for example, prefectures and cities report exclusively to 
the provincial governments, and so down the hierarchy with each level of 
government reporting to the next highest level. These hierarchical relations 
are accentuated by the fact that government officials at all levels are 
appointed, not elected, and by the tight political control exercised by the 
Communist Party up and down all government channels.3 
In local terms, China is a highly decentralized country, with 70 per cent 
of total public expenditures going through subnational government budgets 
in 2003. The current legal framework confers substantial decision making 
autonomy on each level of government, with budgets approved by the 
council (or People's Congress) at the respective level. In reality, as 
discussed further below in this chapter, budgetary autonomy at the 
subnational level is limited in several important ways. But nevertheless 
from a fiscal viewpoint, if not politically or administratively, government in 
China today operates in a largely decentralized fashion. 
The main objective of this chapter is to assess China's current system of 
decentralized finance, highlighting both strengths and weaknesses and the 
challenges ahead for getting decentralization to work more efficiently and 
fairly. Getting to where China is today in terms of decentralization has been 
a 'long march' of trials and errors, dead ends and progressive paths. Before 
we begin the in-depth review of current institutions and their operation, we 
think it is helpful to briefly look back at how China got here today. 
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The system of intergovernmental fiscal relations has experienced several 
major changes since the pro market reforms started in 1979. Throughout 
these changes the system has retained a nested hierarchical structure, with 
the central government setting fiscal arrangements exclusively with the 
provinces, the provinces doing the same with the prefectures, and so on 
down to the counties and settlements. Before 1979, under the central 
planning period, many aspects of public resource allocations were de-
concentrated but the budget process remained highly centralized, with all 
revenues and expenditures going through the central government budget. 
Under planning, price setting was the main allocation rule, and taxes were 
few and their enforcement simple through the state-owned enterprises 
(SOEs).4 
In 1978, China's authorities made the historical decision to abandon 
central planning and adopt a market-oriented policy, and to start opening 
the country's economy to the rest of the world. After some experimentation 
from 1978 to 1983, the Chinese government introduced the first 
comprehensive reform of the fiscal system in 1984, with the name of the 
Fiscal Responsibility System (FRS). Under the FRS, the central government 
tried different revenue sharing arrangements until in 1988 it introduced 
'fiscal contracting' reform. This arrangement consisted of bilateral 
contracts between the center and each of the provinces for fixed periods of 
time, whereby provincial governments in essence were allowed to retain 
part of the tax revenues remaining after the remittance of a fixed sum to the 
central government. This arrangement lasted through 1993. 
A key feature of the contracting system was its (short-term) incentive 
compatibility vis-a-vis subnational governments; unlike in the past, 
provincial governments could now generate more fiscal revenue by 
collecting more tax in any year. However, because of the expectations of 
re-contracting at some point in the future, partly on the basis of what had 
been collected during the former contract period, in the longer term 
subnational governments had negative incentives to exercise lower tax 
effort or to shift resources to extra-budgetary accounts, which would be less 
visible to the central authorities. The system was difficult to administer, as 
there were a large number of fiscal contracts in use, and it involved 
extensive negotiations. The central authorities were eyeballing relatively 
higher revenues and lower expenditure needs for provincial budgets and 
attempting to flush out subnational resources hidden in extra-budgetary 
funds. Meanwhile, the provinces were trying to do exactly the reverse. Tax 
sharing rates were customized for different provinces depending on their 
perceived wealth and needs. The central government used those customized 
shares together with customized transfers with the objective of 
redistributing fiscal resources across subnational governments.5 
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The 'contracting system' rapidly worked against the interests of the 
central government. Because of their de facto control of the tax 
administration, subnational governments engineered ways to contribute 
fewer fiscal resources to the central government by, for example, providing 
subnational SOEs with tax advantages at the expense of the central coffers 
and by hiding resources from the central government in extra-budgetary 
funds.6 Strong competition among subnational governments to attract more 
economic development compounded this behavior. These forces led to a 
fast decrease in the share of the central government in total budget 
revenues, as well as to the decline of total budgetary revenues in GDP.7 
The ratio of revenues to GNP fell ffom 22.4 per cent in 1985 to 10.7 per 
cent in 1995 while the ratio of central government revenues to total 
revenues fell ffom 38.4 per cent in 1985 to 22 per cent in 1993 (Figure 5.1). 
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Figure 5.1 Performance of the 'Two Ratios' 
An important institutional detail of this period that contributed to a 
variety of problems was the fact that tax revenues were shared among the 
center and subnational governments according to the principle of ownership 
(by level of government) of enterprises. This commingled the fiscal 
interests of governments with those of the SOEs, retarding the adaptation to 
market principles, leading to unfair competition and providing incentives 
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for protectionist policies and narrow fiscal interests, for example with each 
province trying to have its own distilleries and cigarette factories. 
These changes in revenue sharing arrangements gradually led to the 
de-linking of revenue assignments from expenditure needs (World Bank, 
2002). The positive side was that the contracting system tended to harden 
the budget constraint of subnational governments, an important step 
towards increased fiscal discipline at the subnational level. One negative 
side was the greater reliance on extra-budgetary funds by subnational 
governments, reducing the transparency and efficiency of budget 
allocations. The lower availability of fiscal resources at the central level in 
this period and the de-linking between revenues and expenditure needs also 
meant that many poor local governments, especially at the lowest levels of 
counties and townships, found themselves incapable of delivering important 
services that had been entrusted to them. 
Facing all these problems, the central government decided to adopt 
fundamental reform of its tax policy, tax administration and 
intergovernmental fiscal relations systems in 1994, which became known as 
the 'Tax-sharing System' (TSS) reform.8 The goal in tax policy was to 
modernize the tax structure by simplifying income taxation, disallowing 
most forms of tax preferences, adopting a credit invoice system for the 
VAT, and introducing excise taxes on a number of goods. In tax 
administration, the TSS reform created separate tax administrations at the 
central and subnational levels. The subnational tax administration bureaus 
were entrusted with the enforcement of income taxes, among others, while 
the central tax administration was responsible for the VAT and for all taxes 
on centrally owned SOEs. These measures in tax policy and administration 
had the distinctive goal of increasing the overall tax take in GDP. 
For intergovernmental fiscal relations, the main goal of the central 
government was to increase the central government share in overall 
revenues and to improve the transparency and stability of revenue 
assignments. The new revenue assignments are discussed below, but in 
essence the reform provided exclusive taxes for the central government 
(e.g., excises) and local governments (e.g., most income taxes), and 
established uniform rules for the sharing of other taxes, including VAT. 
Subnational governments also lost their ability to provide tax advantages to 
SOEs and to increase their extra-budgetary funds from those sources. 
The two fundamental goals of the TSS reform, the improvement of the 
'two ratios' - the central government share in total revenues, and the share 
of revenues in GDP - were achieved. By 2003 the share of the central 
government was back to 54.6 per cent and the share of revenues in GDP 
was at 18.5 per cent. The TSS reform accomplished several other things. It 
simplified the system and righted a series of incentive problems with the 
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previous system mainly by eliminating opportunities. For example, the 
granting of tax advantages was disallowed at the same time as income taxes 
became administered by the subnational tax administrations (except for 
centrally owned SOEs) or the excises were centralized so the incentive to 
build distilleries and tobacco companies all over the place was gone. 
The TSS reform presented two main problems. First, it left the 
problematic and obsolete expenditure assignments inherited from the 
planning era unchanged. Second, it led to the worsening of horizontal fiscal 
disparities. Despite a high volume of transfers, the new system failed to 
equalize enough to guarantee poor subnational governments enough 
resources to supply basic services. Thus a main problem with the current 
intergovernmental finance is a faulty system of transfers. In addition, the 
TSS reform did not go far enough in reforming revenue assignments; 
subnational governments still have little revenue autonomy and the sharing 
of tax revenues is plagued by unfair apportionment issues. Other problems 
with the current system include the lack of subnational borrowing 
autonomy, and issues related to fiscal management and budgetary 
autonomy. The rest of this chapter is dedicated to examining in more detail 
the issues and remaining challenges with all these fundamental aspects of 
the current system of intergovernmental relations in China. 
THE EXPENDITURE ASSIGNMENT 
China does not have a formal explicit assignment of expenditure 
responsibilities among the different levels of government, as other countries 
do either in the Constitution or a major law. The current Budget Law 
discusses the division of expenditure assignments between the central and 
local governments only in very broad terms. Other legal instruments also 
make reference in passing to expenditure assignments.9 
In practice, the actual division of expenditure responsibilities has been 
determined by sectoral and other specialized laws over the years. The main 
division of responsibilities between the central and subnational 
governments as a whole is summarized in Table 5.1. These assignments 
follow, with an important exception, the general principles and international 
practice of assigning competencies according to the size of the benefit area; 
thus public services reaching the entire country are assigned to the central 
level and those with geographically smaller areas are assigned to 
subnational governments. As discussed in more detail below, the exception 
with principles and international practice is the assignment of certain 
aspects of social security, such as unemployment compensation, to the 
subnational level. Besides these elements of social security services and the 
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ordinary responsibilities for public administration and safety and security, it 
is notable that subnational governments' main responsibilities lie in the 
areas of economic development (physical infrastructure and agricultural and 
industrial development) and the provision of social services (education, 
health care, housing and communal services). 
Table 5.1 The Assignment of Expenditure Responsibilities Between the 
Central and, Subnational Governments 
Main expenditure responsibilities of the central government 
Defense 
Foreign affairs 
Operation of the central government 
Operational expenses for cultural, educational, scientific and public health 
undertakings at the central level 
Key capital construction 
Technical renovation and new product development in centrally owned enterprises 
Agriculture 
Subsidies 
Macroeconomic control and regional coordination of economic development 
Social security 
Debt 
Main expenditure responsibilities of Subnational governments 
Operation of subnational governments 
Operational expenses on cultural, educational, scientific and public health 
undertakings at the subnational level 
Subnational capital construction 
Fund for technical renovation and new product development in locally 
owned enterprises 
Agriculture 
Urban maintenance and construction 
Social security 
Subsidies 
Source: Zhang and Martinez-Vazquez (2003). 
The lack of a formal assignment of expenditure responsibility has meant 
that over the years the actual division of expenditure responsibilities among 
the different levels of subnational governments has been left to the 
discretion of the next higher level government. That is, in practice, 
especially at the subnational level, the higher-level government has had 
discretion to determine the assignment of expenditures of the level 
immediately below it. Thus, the provinces determine the service 
assignments of cities/prefectures, and the cities determine the assignments 
of counties and the latter determine the revenues and expenditures of towns 
and townships. 
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Because there are no specific central guidelines on the distribution of 
responsibilities between provinces and lower levels, each province can 
potentially have a different assignment of expenditure responsibilities 
among their four levels of government. The evidence available is that the 
distribution of expenditure responsibilities indeed differs significantly 
among provinces (World Bank, 2002). 
This hierarchical ad hoc approach to expenditure assignments has meant 
necessarily that the central government cannot easily determine the revenue 
needs of subnational governments at the aggregate provincial level. 
Similarly, given the diversity of expenditure assignments within the 
provinces, the central government is very unlikely to be able to design 
policies to deal directly with sub-provincial governments by, for example, 
setting a targeted transfer program or standards for public services 
independently of the provincial authorities. China's system of 
decentralization is thus very hierarchical and the central authorities are very 
unlikely to be able to bypass that hierarchical structure even if they wanted 
to do it. 
The Vertical Composition of Expenditures 
Whatever the degree of formality in expenditure assignment, much of the 
story is told by the actual shares by level and function.10 Table 5.2 (Part I) 
presents the central and local government shares per main expenditure 
category for selected years between 1978 and 2003." While in 1978, the 
share in consolidated expenditures of the central government (46 per cent) 
was quite similar to that of subnational governments (54 per cent), by 2003 
the share for subnational government expenditures had increased to over 
two-thirds and the share of the central government had fallen to under 
one-third of the total. 
These relative shares have been stable for almost ten years, but with a 
slight upward drift for the relative importance of subnational governments. 
From the viewpoint of the actual division of expenditure responsibilities 
Table 5.2 is particularly revealing. There has been a remarkable stability in 
the division of responsibilities for key services. In social services 
(education, health, culture and science) the subnational governments 
accounted for 89 per cent of expenditures in 2003, and this share has 
remained rather stable throughout a long period of time, going all the way 
back to 1978. 
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Much more unusual in a fiscally decentralized system, the role of 
subnational governments in the area of social assistance and welfare has 
remained dominant through the decades. In 2003 subnational governments' 
expenditures in welfare and social security represented a little less than 99 
per cent of total expenditures in this sector, practically unmoved from a 
figure of 100 per cent in 1978. Subnational governments also play a 
dominant role in economic areas such as industry, commerce, and 
agriculture. Areas of change in the central subnational shares include the 
financing of price subsidies, which started mostly as a subnational 
government responsibility, then became more evenly divided, and more 
recently subnational governments have again taken a lead; in 2003, almost 
two-thirds of the price subsidies were paid by subnational governments. 
The central government is practically responsible for the entirety of defense 
expenditures, and also for debt service.12 Capital infrastructure 
responsibilities are also quite decentralized: in 2003, subnational 
governments represented 55 per cent of this type of expenditure. 
The changes over time in the composition of subnational government 
budget expenditures (as a percentage of total budget subnational 
government expenditures) and of central government expenditures are also 
quite telling (Table 5.2, Part II). In 1978, 30.3 per cent of all subnational 
government expenditures were in capital construction, but this had 
decreased to 11 per cent in 2003. Other important expenditure categories at 
the subnational level back in 1978 were expenditures on social services (15 
per cent), and agriculture (11 per cent). In 2003 expenditures in public 
services had increased to 23.2 per cent, while agriculture had decreased to 
5.8 per cent. Another important change in relative importance was the 
increase in government administration expenditures from 6.8 per cent in 
1978 to 16.8 per cent in 2003. Remarkably, the relative importance of 
expenditures in social relief and welfare were at 2.9 per cent of the total in 
1978 and remained at the same level in 2003. At the same time, new 
expenditures have emerged that are not captured by the categories in the 
table - this is reflected in the growth of the residual item 'others', which 
grew from 6 per cent of total local expenditures in 1978 to more than 30 per 
cent in 2003. Included in this residual are expenditures on urban 
maintenance and construction, tax administration, and civil service 
pensions. The major expenditure items for the central government in 1978 
were capital construction (44.5 per cent), defense expenditures (30 per 
cent), and SOE losses (8 per cent). In 2003 the most important expenditures 
at the central level were defense (25.4 per cent), capital construction (20.5 
per cent), and debt service (12.9 per cent). 
As a percentage of GNP, both central and subnational government 
expenditure have experienced a wild ride since the late 1970s. While in 1978 
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subnational expenditures represented 18.2 per cent of GNP and central 
government expenditures 15.6 per cent, by 1995 (the year the 1994 TSS 
reforms were put into effect) these levels had fallen, respectively, to 8.4 per 
cent and 4.3 per cent. By 2003, subnational government expenditures 
relative to GNP had recovered fully at 19.75 per cent. The recovery of 
central government expenditures was more modest and represented 7.3 per 
cent of GNP in 2003. 
In order to get a clearer picture of budgetary subnational government 
expenditures, I recalculated local expenditures to include enterprise 
subsidies, which are treated as negative revenue in official accounts. I also 
regrouped expenditures by function to be able to see with more clarity the 
shifts in the composition of aggregate subnational expenditures through the 
transition period (Table 5.3). The largest reduction in expenditures (by 
share) is in subsidies - with the abolition of nearly all administratively fixed 
prices, the need for price subsidies has been virtually eliminated. The 
government has also gradually reduced subsidies to state-owned enterprises -
even as the number of loss-making SOEs continued to grow through the 
1990s. As a result, spending on subsidies has fallen from 25.1 per cent in 
1986 to only 3.3 per cent of total budgetary expenditures in 2003. 
Expenditures for 'development', comprising capital construction, technical 
renovation in enterprises, geological surveys, science and technology, 
agricultural support, and urban maintenance, have stayed at approximately 
the same level between 26 and 27 per cent. Social spending, comprising 
education, health, culture and science, has increased only moderately, from 
23.8 per cent in 1986 to 26.8 per cent in 2003. Administration expenditures 
rose moderately from 23.8 per cent to 25.8 per cent. The biggest increase 
took place in the residual category of 'other' (defined above), which rose 
from 5.3 per cent in 1986 to 23.3 per cent of the total in 2003. 
The recalculations in Table 5.3 illustrate the difficulty of analyzing 
expenditure composition and changes in policy priorities under the budget 
classification system used in China. 
This system is largely a legacy of the Soviet centrally planned system, 
which uses a mix of functional, economic and organizational categories. 
For example, the classification does not make a clear distinction between 
investment and recurrent expenditures. The separately identified capital 
expenditure item, 'capital construction', does not include all capital 
expenditures, since many agencies such as industry, transport, agriculture, 
and urban construction undertake capital construction activity not included 
in 'capital construction'. Elsewhere, capital expenditures financed under 
earmarked schemes are lumped together with current expenditures. For 
example, the Compulsory Education Program, the largest earmarked grant 
for education, mainly funds capital spending, yet resources are commingled 
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Table 5.3 Recalculated Subnational Expenditures 
Part I: Shares of Total (%) 1986 1995 2000 2003 
1. Adjusted Total 100 100 100 100 
2. Capital Construction 13.1 8.1 10.9 10.9 
3. Technical Transformation 5.0 6.4 4.7 4.7 
4. Makeshift Building 0.5 0.2 0.0 0.0 
5. Geological Prospecting 0.0 0.0 0.4 0.5 
6. Science & Technology 0.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 
7. Working Capital 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.0 
8. Agricultural Support3 3.4 7.5 6.5 5.7 
9. Agriculture & Fisheries 4.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 
10. Industry, Transport, Commerce 1.5 1.3 1.0 1.2 
11. Urban Maintenance 4.6 5.6 4.4 4.9 
12. Urban Employment Placement 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 
13. Culture, Education, Healthb 21.3 25.9 22.9 22.9 
14. Science 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 
15. Other Administration 3.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 
16. Welfare Assistance 2.3 2.2 2.0 2.8 
17. Militia 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 
18. Air Defense 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
19. Administration 9.1 15.8 15.5 19.7 
20. Policy Subsidies0 15.9 5.2 3.7 2.2 
21. Other 4.0 15.3 23.7 21.5 
22. Earmarked Expendituresd 1.0 0.4 1.9 1.8 
23. Enterprise Loss Subsidies 9.2 5.3 2.2 1.1 
Part II: Shares of Total (%) 1986 1995 2000 2003 
1. Total Subsidies 25.1 10.4 5.9 3.3 
2. Development 27.5 27.7 26.8 26.8 
3. Administration' 18.4 17.1 16.5 20.9 
4. Social® 23.8 28.1 24.9 25.8 
5. All others 5.3 16.6 25.8 23.3 
6. Memo item: 
7. Reported Totalh 138 000 482 833 1045428 1722985 
Notes: 
a In 1995 and 1999 this item is combined with running costs of Agric. 
b Includes science in later years, 
c Prior to 1998 this was called 'price subsidies', 
d In 1995 this item comprises new product development funds and aid 
e Development = Part I item numbers: (1+2+3+4+5+6+10). 
f Administration = Part I item numbers: (8+9+14+15+16+18). 
g Social = Part I item numbers: (11+12+15). 
h Total Subsidies = Part 1 item numbers: (19+22). 
Departments, 
to poor regions. 
Source: MOF data, China Statistics Yearbook, various years. 
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with allocations for recurrent expenditures at the local level. In addition, the 
expenditures incurred by different departments as shown in the budget do 
not represent functional categories. There are multiple heads to show 
expenditures on a single major function. For example, administrative 
expenditures are scattered through several headings including 
'administration' and 'other administration'. Nor is it possible to identify the 
expenditures incurred on maintenance of infrastructure capital stock to 
assess its adequacy. 
Main Issues with Expenditure Assignments 
Lack of clear assignments 
The lack of a formal clear assignment has some advantages. For example, it 
requires provincial governments and all other tiers down the hierarchy to 
adapt to the specific characteristics of the local entities below them. Either 
because the characteristics of provinces differ or for other reasons, there 
appear in fact to be significant differences in the intra-provincial 
organization of expenditure responsibilities (World Bank, 2002). The lack 
of a clear formal assignment, however, also has disadvantages. One of 
these is that the lack of guidelines from the law or the central government 
has let many provincial governments push down expenditure 
responsibilities to the lowest levels of governments without adequate 
funding and capacity. In addition, these lower levels appear to have no 
comparative advantage in delivering, for example, a variety of health and 
education services. The lack of clarity and the ad hoc decisions about 
responsibilities can also easily lead to friction, inefficiencies and sometimes 
the failure to deliver the service. 
This lack of clarity in the de facto assignment of responsibilities is 
compounded by a high degree of concurrent and overlapping expenditures 
among the subnational levels in China.13 Although in theory there is nothing 
necessarily wrong with concurrent assignments in particular areas, and 
sometimes they may be desirable, in practice, concurrent responsibilities 
make it harder to identify what level of government should be accountable 
for the delivery of particular services. Inefficient under-provision of 
services is more likely in the presence of extensive concurrent 
responsibilities. In the case of concurrent responsibilities for education, 
expenditure responsibilities are divided in practice by 'ownership'; this 
means that a school set up by the county is financed from county funds, 
while one set up by the township is financed from the township budget, and 
so on. The involvement of poor townships in the delivery of education 
services appears to continue despite the fact that the central government has 
repeatedly called for counties to finance rural basic education. 
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The inability of many subnational governments to deliver critical 
services assigned to them has increasingly made the central government 
play the role of the rescuer of last resort, especially in the areas of social 
security and safety net. The growing bailouts to local governments would 
seem to indicate not only that current expenditure assignments may not be 
sustainable, but also that the roles of different tiers are increasingly blurred. 
They also signal the willingness of the central government to accept 
incrementally more responsibility for financing certain functions 
traditionally assigned to the subnational level. 
Inefficient expenditure assignments 
There are many problem areas in the current practice with the assignments. 
Among the most conspicuous are the following: cities at the prefecture and 
county levels are fully responsible for unemployment insurance and social 
security and welfare;14 counties and townships, the lowest tiers of 
government, are responsible for the majority of education and health 
expenditures; and local governments in general are responsible for social 
protection and welfare programs. The assignment of these responsibilities is 
out of line with international practice and first principles. In fact, the 
assignment of responsibilities for social security at the lower levels of 
government puts China in a league of its own since no other country in the 
world has a similar practice. Given the large population of many of China's 
provinces a case could be made for reassigning social security to this level, 
as opposed to the central level, as is usually done in other countries. 
However, it appears that even for pension schemes, the effort to move 
toward provincial pooling has made only limited progress. The inability of 
many local governments to finance the social safety net has led in recent 
years to widespread pension arrears and defaults that have forced the central 
government to intervene with subsidies. The assignment of education, 
health, and social assistance to county and township governments, which 
often have limited administrative capacity and meager fiscal resources, has 
also led to serious deficiencies in the services provided. 
The fulfillment of capital expenditure responsibilities 
Local governments are, correctly, responsible for financing the 
infrastructure needed to deliver the services assigned to them. However, in 
reality many local governments, especially counties and townships, lack the 
liquid resources to undertake the required investments. But since local 
governments are not permitted to borrow, the system currently provides no 
clear answer for local officials on how to develop capital infrastructure 
other than to beg from a higher-level government or make use of extra-
budgetary channels. Given the vast unmet needs for new and replacement 
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capital infrastructure, it would seem that it is time for the central 
government to consider how best to allow responsible and well-regulated 
subnational borrowing. Substantial borrowing has already occurried through 
local enterprises, project entities, and other more or less legitimate channels. 
Thus again, as in the case of the illegal fees, it would seem preferable if the 
central government were to accept the reality of subnational government 
borrowing and take the initiative to regulate and control this process better. 
REVENUE ASSIGNMENTS AND TAX AUTONOMY 
The 1994 the TSS reform represented a significant change for the central-
subnational revenue assignments. Major accomplishments of the 1994 
reform were the discontinuance of the contractual or negotiated system 
between the central and provincial government, replacing it with an explicit 
and stable revenue assignment, and the creation of separate tax 
administrations for the enforcement of central and local taxes. 
Current Revenue Assignments 
As mentioned above, the 1994 TSS reform introduced explicit revenue 
assignments between the central and provincial governments by distinguishing 
three categories of taxes: central government 'own' taxes, local government 
'own' taxes, and shared taxes between the two levels of government (Table 5.4). 
Several features are notable in this formal revenue assignment. First, 
with the very minor exceptions discussed below, the TSS reform did not 
provide provincial governments with any significant degree of tax 
autonomy, in particular the discretion to set rates for their 'own' taxes. 
Second, following the hierarchical vertical structure tradition, the TSS 
reform only provided explicit revenue assignments between the central and 
provincial governments, leaving it to the discretion of provincial 
governments to arrange revenue assignments at the sub-provincial level. 
Third, elements of the previous 'contracting system' of revenue 
assignments were kept in place. To win the support for the TSS reform from 
the provinces that stood to lose the most, the central government agreed to 
phase in the reforms over a number of years, which in effect kept all 
provinces at the revenues they had in 1993. This was achieved through the 
introduction of a formula-based 'tax rebate' to each province. This tax 
rebate has represented since 1995 the most important form of transfer from 
the central government to the provinces. Fourth, for major taxes the TSS 
reform failed to centralize the VAT and assigned 100 per cent of personal 
income tax (PIT) and enterprise income tax (EIT) to local governments.'5 
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Table 5.4 Revenue Assignments between the Central and Subnational 
Governments 
I. Taxes exclusively assigned to the Central Government 
1. Excise taxes 
2. Income tax of all central government enterprises 
3. Taxes collected from the Ministry of Railroads and from the headquarters of 
banks and insurance companies 
4. Income taxes, sales taxes and royalties from offshore oil activities of foreign 
companies and joint ventures 
5. Energy and transportation fund contribution 
6. Seventy per cent of the three sales taxes collected from enterprises owned by 
the Ministry of Industry, the Ministry of Power, SINOPEC (petrochemicals), 
and the China nonferrous metals companies 
7. All customs duty, VAT and excise taxes on imports 
8. Enterprise income tax collected from banks and other fin'l institutions 
II. Taxes shared between the central and subnational governments 
1. Value-added tax (75 per cent central, 25 per cent provincial) 
2. Nat'l resource taxes (coal, gas, oil & other minerals if the enter, are fully Chinese owned) 
3. Construction tax on the cost of construction of buildings that are outside the 
plan and financed from retained earnings 
4. Salt tax 
5. Security and exchange tax (50 per cent central, 50 per cent provincial)3 
6. Ind'l and comm'l tax, and income tax levied on foreign & joint venture enterprises 
III. Taxes exclusively assigned to subnational governments 
1. Income tax and adjustment tax of locally owned state enterprises, collectives, 
and private enterprisesb 
2. Business (gross receipts) tax falling on sectors not covered by VAT 
(transportation and communications, constr., fin. and ins., post and 
telecommunications, culture and sports, enter., hotels and restaurants, and other) 
3. Rural market (stall rental) trading tax 
4. The urban maintenance and construction tax (a surcharge on the tax liability of 
enterprises for business tax, consumption tax, and VAT) 
5. The urban land use tax 
6. Vehicle and vessel utilization tax 
7. Thirty per cent of the product and VAT revenues collected from enterprises 
owned by the Ministry of Industry, Ministry of Power, SINOPEC, and the 
China nonferrous metals companies 
8. Individual income taxb 
9. Value-added tax on land 
10. Education surtax 
11. Entertainment and slaughter taxes 
12. Property tax 
13. Surtax on collective enterprises 
14. Resources tax 
15. Fixed asset investment tax (discontinued in 1999) 
16. Fines for delinquent taxes 
Notes'. 
a Starting in 1997, the central government share increased several years ending at 97 per cent in 2002. 
b Starting in 2002, the central government has a share in the collection receipts from these taxes. 
Source: Updated from Bahl (1999b). 
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Table 5.5 The Relative Shares of Different Sources of Revenues (2003)* 
(Computed without Subsidies to Loss-making Enterprises) 
Percentage Share'0 Total Revenue 
Region 
(RMB 
10 000 Yuan) 
Value-Added 
Tax 
Business 
Tax 
6 435 934 11.69 40.97 
2 075 295 21.78 30.99 
3 373 823 20.37 19.37 
1 878 534 27.34 19.50 
1 393 306 16.22 26.08 
4 503 797 18.98 26.44 
1 602 981 19.14 21.85 
2 510438 23.36 18.38 
9 224 143 18.45 36.03 
8 054 123 22.53 25.73 
7 537 731 20.56 29.20 
2 230 407 16.57 20.61 
3 050 039 17.83 27.78 
1 683 862 13.70 25.63 
7 186 771 17.54 20.14 
3397595 17.06 22.17 
2 640 044 17.29 21.75 
2 726 273 13.25 22.09 
13 183 733 17.73 31.54 
2 051 950 13.98 23.35 
513 205 12.40 31.30 
1 638 937 15.05 28.46 
3 393 318 14.17 26.41 
1 250 921 15.53 25.15 
2 313 589 16.90 19.52 
90 685 10.33 44.29 
1 786 306 17.71 28.58 
889 465 20.38 27.06 
240 451 21.84 30.39 
300 321 16.79 36.28 
1 282 302 19.64 31.08 
100 440 279 18.03 27.55 
3 240 009 17.62 27.04 
3 016481 3.70 6.35 
0.93 0.21 0.23 
13 183 733 27.34 44.29 
90 685 10.33 18.38 
Beijing 
Tianjin 
Hebei 
Shanxi 
Inner Mongolia 
Liaoning 
Jilin 
Heilongjiang 
Shanghai 
Jiangsu 
Zhejiang 
Anhui 
Fujian 
Jiangxi 
Shandong 
Henan 
Hubei 
Hunan 
Guangdong 
Guangxi 
Hainan 
Chongqing 
Sichuan 
Guizhou 
Yunnan 
Tibet 
Shaanxi 
Gansu 
Qinghai 
Ningxia 
Xinjiang 
Total 
Mean 
Standard Deviation 
Coefficient of Variation 
Maximum 
Minimum 
jyuic*. 
a All other categories in the Yearbook not listed in this table include Resource Tax, Tax on 
the Adjustment of the Investment in the Fixed Assets, Tax on Real Estates, Stamp Tax, Tax 
on the Use of Urban Land, Land Value Added Tax, Tax on the Use of Vehicles and Ships, 
Slaughter Tax, Banquet Tax, Tax on Animal Husbandry, Tax on the Occupancy of 
Cultivated Land, Contract Tax, State-owned Assets Profit, Income From Use of Sea Area, 
Field and Diggings and Other Income, 
b The computations are based on the magnitude of shares in total revenue. Categories in this 
table are slightly different than those in the Yearbook. 
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TableS.5 The Relative Shares of Different Sources of Revenues (2003)* (cont'd) 
(Computed without Subsidies to Loss-making Enterprises) 
Percentage Shareb 
Enterprises' 
Income Tax^ 
Individual 
Income Tax 
Tax on Urban 
Maint. & Const. 
Agricultural 
TaxW 
Income from 
Admin. Fees 
14.56 8.89 4.48 0.10 2.82 
11.47 6.04 5.20 0.18 7.10 
8.50 5.38 5.56 7.66 8.73 
7.58 4.57 6.90 2.14 7.18 
5.14 3.90 5.00 5.78 8.83 
7.98 5.23 5.72 2.29 8.41 
7.36 4.87 5.82 7.63 9.36 
4.29 4.37 8.37 7.15 6.05 
15.84 7.79 3.86 0.01 2.47 
11.51 4.99 5.75 3.30 6.31 
14.13 6.07 5.60 0.72 2.70 
8.54 3.69 5.97 11.97 10.30 
12.07 6.97 4.56 1.60 7.03 
5.79 4.32 4.88 9.51 10.81 
9.24 3.62 6.18 7.57 10.54 
8.57 4.59 6.05 11.90 8.84 
8.09 4.35 6.58 9.80 9.22 
4.94 4.46 5.99 9.62 12.79 
12.90 7.19 3.62 0.71 6.65 
6.36 5.04 4.64 8.76 10.72 
5.07 5.42 5.35 7.76 9.21 
5.35 4.80 5.28 4.65 15.82 
7.30 4.23 6.07 6.77 12.46 
6.66 4.35 6.95 8.10 9.36 
9.29 3.62 10.19 10.75 5.36 
7.89 3.14 3.49 — 6.97 
7.16 3.84 6.88 6.08 5.75 
5.97 4.13 7.88 7.17 6.46 
5.06 3.26 6.44 3.22 5.18 
5.61 4.34 6.16 2.49 6.79 
4.06 4.95 7.40 3.40 7.64 
10.39 5.65 5.44 4.24 7.11 
8.20 4.92 5.90 5.63 8.00 
3.17 1.33 1.40 3.71 2.95 
0.39 0.27 0.24 0.66 0.37 
15.84 8.89 10.19 11.97 15.82 
4.06 3.14 3.49 0.01 2.47 
Notes: 
c Enterprises' Income Tax is the result of combining the figures of Enterprises' Income Tax 
with Return for Enterprises' Income Tax in the Yearbook, 
d The Agricultural Tax is the result of combining Agricultural Tax and Tax on Special 
Agricultural Products in the Yearbook. 
Source: China Statistics Yearbook, 2004. 
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Starting in the late 1990s the government has added some new taxes and 
assigned them to central revenues, as well as revised some of the 
assignments of taxes, especially related to the PIT and the EIT.'6 Although 
the 1994 Tax Sharing System (TSS) reform had assigned the EIT and the 
PIT as local taxes, in 2002 receipts from these two taxes were split 50-50 
between central and local governments.'7 In 2003, the central government 
sharing rate was increased to 60 per cent. There were no further changes in 
2004. 
Actual Revenue Shares 
Only a few of the taxes assigned to the local level are of any revenue 
significance. The relative importance in total revenues at the province level 
(and below) of different taxes is summarized in Table 5.5. In China, the 
item 'Subsidies to Loss-making State-owned Enterprises' is still considered 
a 'negative source of revenue'. However, the relative shares of different 
sources of revenues are computed in Table 5.5 without this item, in order to 
provide a less distorted picture of collections. 
On average, the most important sources of local revenues (consolidated 
by province) are the business tax18 with 27 per cent, the VAT, with 18 per 
cent and the EIT with 10 per cent. Smaller but still significant sources of 
revenues are the PIT with 5 per cent, the tax on urban construction and the 
maintenance tax also with 5 per cent, and the agricultural tax with less than 
4 per cent. The relative importance of administrative fees has risen in 
recent years and in 2003 they represented 7 per cent of total subnational 
revenues.19 On average, subsidies to loss-making SOEs represent less than 
3 per cent of total revenues and have continued to decrease in recent years. 
There is significant variation across the provinces for every single 
source of revenue, as captured by the coefficient of variation and the range 
between the maximum and minimum values across provinces, indicated at 
the bottom of Table 5.5. For example, administrative fees represent 15.8 
per cent of the revenues in Chongqing but only 2.5 per cent in Shanghai. 
There is not necessarily a rich and poor explanation for the composition of 
revenues. For example, the business tax represented 41 per cent in Beijing 
and and 36 per cent in Shanghai but also 44 per cent in Tibet. It is also 
interesting that 'Subsidies to Loss-making State-owned Enterprises' has a 
larger variation across provinces than any source of revenue. Subsidies 
represent 12 per cent of revenues and about 10 per cent in Beijing and 
Zhejian. 
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Table 5.6 The Aggregate Performance of Subnational Revenue Collections, 
1978-2003 
Budgetary revenue Subnational Subnational 
collections as a per cent . collection as a expenditure as a 
of GNP per cent of total per cent of 
Year Total Subnat'l Central collection subnat 7 collection 
1978 31.6 26.7 4.9 84.5 61.7 
1979 28.7 22.9 5.8 79.8 68.5 
1980 25.9 19.6 6.4 75.5 64.2 
1981 24.6 18.1 6.5 73.5 59.3 
1982 23.3 16.7 6.7 71.4 66.8 
1983 23.5 15.1 8.4 64.2 74.1 
1984 23.6 14.0 9.6 59.5 82.6 
1985 22.3 13.7 8.6 61.6 97.9 
1986 20.8 13.2 7.6 63.3 101.9 
1987 18.4 12.2 6.2 66.5 96.8 
1988 15.8 10.6 5.2 67.1 104.0 
1989 15.8 10.9 4.9 69.1 105.0 
1990 15.8 10.5 5.3 66.2 106.9 
1991 14.8 10.2 4.6 69.1 103.8 
1992 13.1 9.4 3.7 71.9 102.7 
1993 12.6 9.8 2.8 78.0 98.2 
1994 11.2 5.0 6.2 44.3 174.7 
1995 10.9 5.2 5.7 47.8 161.7 
1996 11.1 5.6 5.5 50.6 154.4 
1997 11.8 6.0 5.8 51.1 151.5 
1998 12.8 6.5 6.4 50.5 153.9 
1999 14.2 7.0 7.3 48.9 161.5 
2000 15.2 7.3 7.9 47.8 161.8 
2001 17.1 8.2 9.0 47.6 168.3 
2002 18.3 8.2 10.0 45.0 179.5 
2003 18.6 8.4 10.2 45.4 174.9 
Source: China Statistics Yearbook, various years. 
The aggregate performance of local revenue collections as a percentage 
of GNP has experienced significant fluctuations since the late 1970s. Local 
revenues deteriorated rapidly from the 1980s to the mid-1990s, under the 
contracting system, and they began to improve steadily after the 1994 TSS 
reform. Local budgetary revenue collections went from 26.7 per cent of 
GNP in 1978 to 5 per cent of GNP in 1994 to 8.4 per cent in 2003 
(Table 5.6). The turnaround in performance is also captured by the 
significant jump in the buoyancy coefficient of local budgetary revenues 
with respect to GNP, which during the 1978-93 period stood at 0.587 and 
increased to 1.597 in the 1994-99 period (Table 5.6). Nevertheless, the 
share of local revenues in total government budgetary revenue collections 
has declined almost steadily from a high of 84.5 per cent in 1978 to 45 per 
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cent in 2003. The increasing dependency of subnational governments on 
central transfers is revealed by a steady increase in the ratio of subnational 
government budgetary expenditures to subnational budgetary revenues, 
which stood at 175 per cent in 2003 (Table 5.6). However, including tax 
rebates as local revenues (rather than as transfers) would significantly 
reduce this degree of dependence. To the extent that tax rebates are 
non-discretionary transfers, the real dependence of local governments on 
central transfers is much less than indicated by budgetary statistics. 
Sub-provincial Revenue Assignments 
The 1994 TSS reform, as pointed out above, did not provide a specific 
revenue assignment structure at the sub-provincial level. Instead, continuing 
a long tradition, provincial governments were given the discretion to 
arrange revenue assignments with their local governments in any way they 
wanted to. It appears that the provincial governments follow the traditional 
hierarchical approach by setting only revenue assignments between the 
province and the first layer of local governments, the cities and prefectures. 
In turn, the cities and prefectures are left to their own discretion to arrange 
revenue assignments with the next layer of local governments, the counties. 
The same applies for the counties vis-a-vis the lowest layer of local 
governments, the towns and townships. The discretion to design revenue 
assignments at the sub-provincial level basically implies the existence of a 
large variety of revenue assignments at the sub-provincial level. This 
tendency is reinforced by the discretion available to them to introduce 
extra-budgetary and off-budget revenue instruments. 
Soon after the 1994 TSS reform, the central authorities demanded that 
the provinces formalize their tax assignments with lower levels. Different 
arrangements have emerged characterized by how 'local' taxes and tax 
rebates have been shared among the different tiers. These can be roughly 
grouped into three types (Shi, 1998). In the first group, the provincial 
governments have chosen to pass through all local taxes and rebates to 
sub-provincial levels.20 In a second group are those provinces that have kept 
a portion of local taxes and rebates.21 In the third group, which may be 
called the centralizing provinces, the provincial level has captured a 
relatively large portion of all local taxes and rebates.22 Table 5.7 shows the 
sharing arrangement in Hebei, Jiangsu, Gansu and Hunan Provinces. The 
overwhelming criterion in the arrangements for tax assignments and 
revenue sharing at the sub-provincial level appears to be the 'ownership' 
principle: the level of government which owns the enterprise paying taxes is 
entitled to receive those taxes. This criterion applies for the sharing of taxes 
and also for the allocation of 'rebate transfers' from the central government. 
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Table 5.7 Revenue-Sharing Arrangements in Four Provinces (2002) 
Cent'I 
Govt-
Prov. Hebei Jiangsu Gansu Hunan 
'Old System' 
Remittance/Subsidy 
Re­
tained 
Re­
tained Retained Retained Retained 
Subnational Share 
of VAT 
25% 25% 12.5% retained by 
province, except 
in counties facing 
fin'l difficulties 
25% 5% 
retained 
by prov. 
- 20% 
passed 
through 
Rebate of the 
Incremental VAT 
and Excise 
30% 30% 25% passed 
through 
20% 
passed 
through 
20% 
passed 
through 
Additional Transfers Rich counties make 
add'l 'contributions' 
to finance provincial 
expends. & transfers 
Source: World Bank (2002). 
Main Issues with Revenue Assignments 
Although the 1994 TSS reform introduced explicit and stable sharing 
arrangements at the central-provincial level, representing a marked 
improvement over the contracting system that was in place before, the TSS 
failed to address a list of several other important issues. 
Insufficient formal revenue autonomy 
The most effective way to provide budgetary accountability and 
responsiveness is by granting local governments a meaningful degree of tax 
autonomy. Through local tax autonomy taxpayers become more aware of 
the costs of services and local officials' actions are subject to closer scrutiny 
by taxpayers. An adequate degree of tax autonomy is also important as a 
form of addressing vertical imbalances and for providing local governments 
with creditworthiness in capital markets. However, with the very limited 
exceptions discussed below, local governments at the present time lack 
discretion to change the rates or any other element of the taxes assigned to 
them. The only local tax autonomy provided in the 1994 TSS reform was 
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restricted to the selection of the rate of the land use tax within maximum 
and minimum legislated rates, and the choice of introducing (or not) the 
entertainment tax and the slaughter tax. 
Backdoor revenue autonomy23 
The budget pressures on subnational budgets, in part the result of the lack of 
formal revenue autonomy, over the years has led local governments to 
exercise 'informal' revenue autonomy in various ways. The most important 
of these has been the introduction of fees well beyond what has been 
prescribed in the law. For this reason, many of these fees are often referred 
to as 'illegal' fees. Fees represent the main source of local extra-budgetary 
funds, which, although declining in importance, still represent a significant 
part of local budgets.24 The list of fees includes surcharges on household 
utility bills, hospitals and school charges, road maintenance, advertisement, 
vehicle purchases and so on. 
The proliferation of 'illegal' fees at the local level became a matter of 
concern for the central authorities because of the distortions created in the 
allocation of resources, compliance costs for taxpayers, and their potential 
regressivity. On the other hand, these fees have contributed significantly to 
the funding required to cover basic expenditure needs of local governments. 
And although they have been termed 'illegal', it appears that in most cases 
the fees are approved by the provincial authorities. However, the policy 
being pursued by the central authorities of converting fees into taxes or 
budgetary fees is justified because of the need to reduce and eventually 
eliminate the practice of extra-budgetary funds. This is needed to increase 
the transparency of subnational budgets and to increase efficiency in the 
allocation of public resources. Somewhat paradoxically, despite the 
significant budgetary importance of fees, local governments in China do not 
make wide use of fees for cost recovery purposes in those services where 
benefits are localized to individuals and where exclusion from the service is 
possible for those individuals that do not pay. For example, there is little 
reliance on user charges to finance public utility services, such as water and 
sewerage services. 
Lack of formal revenue assignments below the province level 
The lack of formal assignments for local governments provides provincial 
governments with budget flexibility but it also carries important costs, 
including lower revenue autonomy and reduced intergovernmental 
accountability. In addition, this approach reduces the revenue predictability 
of local governments, diminishing their ability to plan and budget for 
expenditures. But more importantly, the lack of formal assignments creates 
negative incentives for revenue mobilization and encourages local 
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governments to hide resources in extra-budgetary funds. Of course, the 
costs for local governments depend on the actual policies followed by the 
provinces. In some provinces, sub-provincial revenue assignments appear to 
have remained stable for many years. 
Despite the problems, there has been no hurry to explore the adoption of 
open formal revenue assignments at the sub-provincial level. Perhaps there 
is not as much instability and uncertainty as some believe. There is little 
doubt, however, that formal assignments to all levels of government, which 
provide some exclusive autonomous tax basis to each, need to be in the 
reform agenda of the central government. The central authorities may opt 
for issuing voluntary recommendations defining mandatory principles, or 
even legislating the entire structure of revenue assignments at the 
sub-provincial level. The option of mandating full revenue assignments is 
more common in unitary countries, generally smaller and less complex than 
China. Given the diversity, size, and complexity of China's provinces, a 
completely uniform system of revenue assignments mandated by the central 
government may not be the most desirable option. 
Revenue sharing and apportionment of tax revenues 
Several problems exist with the current revenue assignments between the 
central and provincial governments. The first problem is created by the 
sharing of the VAT with local governments on the basis of the 'derivation 
principle' (i.e., according to where the tax is collected). This type of 
arrangement generally leads to an unfair distribution of resources since the 
VAT can be credited and debited in different local jurisdictions, or it may 
be paid exclusively where the headquarters of the enterprise is located. The 
current revenue-sharing arrangement for the VAT also has significantly 
contributed to the increasing disparities in revenue distribution across 
provinces in favor of the richest provinces, and it has also led to 
protectionist policies by local jurisdictions attempting to maximize their 
share of the VAT.25 These difficulties have led other countries to centralize 
VAT revenues, as most recently has been the case in Russia, where VAT 
and other central government revenues are distributed according to a 
formula-based system of equalization transfers and other grants. Other 
countries use other approaches to share the VAT with the subnational 
governments, for example, population in Germany, or estimates of 
aggregate consumption in Spain and Maritime Provinces in Canada.26 
Another problem related to sharing the VAT is the existence of the 
'business' or gross receipts tax assigned to local governments, which falls 
on a number of service sectors excluded from the VAT. From a tax policy 
perspective, it is clear that the highly distortionary business tax should be 
abolished, and the coverage of the VAT extended to most of those sectors 
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now under the business tax. However, the business tax currently represents 
the most significant source of revenue for local governments; thus this 
reform would need to be closely integrated with the reform of the sharing of 
the VAT between central and subnational governments, and the reform of 
revenue assignments in general. 
The choice of the enterprise income tax (EIT) to be shared with local 
governments, especially below the provincial level, is also a problem. The 
EIT is not an ideal tax for local governments because it is an unstable 
source and burdens can be exported to other communities, detracting from 
accountability. Also because the tax base of the EIT is less evenly 
distributed, it can enhance horizontal fiscal disparities. The sharing of the 
EIT with local governments is further complicated by two factors. The first 
is the survival of the 'ownership' criterion, meaningful under the planned 
socialist economy paradigm, but irrelevant in the transition to a market 
economy. The second factor is that tax sharing of the EIT is by place of 
registration or the headquarters of the enterprise, which is a source of 
inequities. China may have to live with revenue sharing of the EIT between 
the central and local governments, but how these revenues are actually 
shared can be significantly improved through apportionment formulas and 
the like. 
Despite the problem, the importance of VAT and EIT to subnational 
governments today means that reform and reassignment of these key taxes 
may be politically impossible except in the context of a comprehensive 
reform of intergovernmental fiscal relations and the tax system. Good 
alternatives exist. For example, a superior source of subnational revenues 
could be the use of piggyback personal income tax, especially considering 
how underutilized this tax has been in China.27 The property tax is another 
tax with great potential at the local level, but one that is too complicated and 
not well administered today.28 Meanwhile, the central government, through 
the recent centralization of personal income tax revenues starting in 2002, 
appears to be centralizing the wrong tax: the personal income tax instead of 
the VAT. 
The role of tax administration in intergovernmental fiscal relations 
The 1994 TSS reforms split China's tax administration system into two 
separate bodies, a central tax administration in charge of collecting central 
and shared tax revenues, and a local tax administration in charge of 
exclusively collecting local taxes. This reform pursued a more 'incentive 
compatible' arrangement in comparison to the arrangement under the 
previous (contracting) system where a single tax administration body, 
largely controlled by the subnational authorities, collected all taxes. That 
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previous administrative arrangement had been seen as the main culprit for 
the precipitous fall in collections, especially for central government 
revenues. Despite the two reforms, several problems still remain. 
The old official and personal allegiances of central tax administrators to 
local government officials, at the province, city and county levels, appear to 
continue. It is common among local governments to provide both bonuses 
and penalties for the performance of central tax administrators at their level. 
In some cases, the local governments also cover some of the costs of central 
tax administrators, such as health insurance. This is evidence that there may 
still be conflict of interests among administrators. Local officials are likely 
more interested in increasing the after-tax profits of enterprises they own 
than in increasing tax collections for the central government. Thus there is 
still work to be done to eliminate the de facto dual subordination of central 
tax administration officials. 
While there are four subnational levels of government, there is only one 
tax administration agency. The conflict of interest and the moral hazard 
problems that existed prior to the 1994 TSS reforms between the central and 
local governments have reappeared in similar forms in the enforcement of 
all local taxes by the single agency controlled by the provincial authorities. 
Counties and prefectures often feel that their interests are not adequately 
addressed. In the future, as China moves toward explicit assignments of tax 
revenues at the sub-provincial level, it will be desirable to introduce 
separate tax administrations at the prefecture/city level, and even at the 
county level. 
INTERGOVERNMENTAL TRANSFERS 
As discussed above, there has been a growing mismatch between 
expenditure and revenue assignments at the subnational level in China. 
While expenditure assignments have been kept steady and needs have 
expanded over times, revenues have been increasingly centralized. This 
type of vertical imbalance between central and subnational governments is 
not uncommon. As growth and overall economic development have been 
markedly unbalanced among China's provinces and across local 
governments within provinces over the last decades, horizontal fiscal 
disparities or imbalances have increased quite significantly. The central 
government has designed a system of transfers to address these vertical and 
horizontal imbalances. Conditional transfers have also been introduced to 
help the central authorities pursue national objectives and priorities through 
the budgets and activities of subnational governments. 
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Vertical and Horizontal Imbalances 
There is no clearly best way to measure vertical fiscal imbalances - the 
mismatch between expenditure responsibilities and available funding- at 
different levels of government. One difficulty lies with ambiguity on 
'needs', unless predetermined quantities and qualities of public services are 
agreed upon. However, vertical imbalances may be manifest when local 
governments lack resources to provide the most basic level of services at 
the same time they are experiencing budget deficits. The most effective and 
perhaps simplest way to close vertical imbalances is to provide local 
governments with meaningful revenue autonomy, which they can use to 
expand or contract their budgets to match the demand and ability to pay for 
services. Clearly, by these standards, there is a pronounced vertical 
imbalance among China's local governments. The measurement of these 
imbalances is complicated by the pervasive presence of extra-budgetary 
funds and the suspicion at the upper levels of government that lower levels 
have the funds hidden to finance necessities they say they cannot afford. As 
can be seen in Figure 5.2, the gap between subnational expenditures and 
revenues as a percentage of total figures increased significantly after the 
1994 reform and it has not improved since then. This illustrates the 
significant transfer dependence of subnational governments in China. 
The evidence on horizontal fiscal disparities is easier to gather. As 
shown in Table 5.8, per capita tax revenues in 2003 were as high as RMB 
5391 yuan in Shanghai and as low as RMB 323 yuan in Guizhou province. 
A disparity of over 16-fold in revenues per capita between the richest and 
poorest province is extraordinarily high by international standards and 
demonstrates the existence of wide horizontal fiscal disparities, and the 
available evidence is that these disparities have continued to increase over 
time (see Figure 5.3). There is also evidence that fiscal disparities are quite 
pronounced within provinces (World Bank, 2002). As these disparities 
related to the level of economic development, they show up across all major 
tax sources, most importantly in the business tax (Table 5.8). 
Property taxes tend to be less concentrated geographically than taxes on 
enterprise income. Horizontal fiscal disparities are caused not only by 
differences in the geographical distribution of the tax base but also by the 
structure of taxes. For example, the relatively high coefficient of variation 
for the distribution of per capita revenues from the individual income tax, at 
1.67 in 2003, is likely related to the high minimum exemption threshold for 
this tax. The adoption of uniform tax and sharing rules in the 1994 TSS 
reform, otherwise desirable, also caused an increase in disparities because 
under the previous contracting system central authorities were able to 
'regulate' or discriminate between richer and poorer provinces. 
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Local Expenditures as per cent of total 
Source: MOF data, China Statistics Yearbook, various years. 
Year 
Source: MOF data, China Statistics Yearbook, various years. 
Figure 5.3 The Coefficient of Variation of Per Capita Subnational 
Budgetary Expenditure Across Provinces, 1985-2002 
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Table 5.8 Horizontal Revenue Disparities across Subnational 
Governments in 2003 (RMB Yuan per capita) 
Total Value-added Business 
Region Revenue Tax Tax 
Beijing 4 419.07 516.72 1 810.59 
Tianjin 2 052.11 446.88 636.04 
Hebei 498.39 101.51 96.54 
Shanxi 566.80 154.96 110.52 
Inner Mongolia 585.52 94.95 152.68 
Liaoning 1 069.79 203.07 282.88 
Jilin 592.88 113.50 129.52 
Heilongjiang 658.04 153.71 120.94 
Shanghai 5 391.08 994.74 1 942.22 
Jiangsu 1 087.54 244.99 279.81 
Zhejiang 1 610.78 331.24 470.27 
Anhui 347.96 57.65 71.72 
Fujian 874.44 155.95 242.92 
Jiangxi 395.81 54.22 101.46 
Shandong 787.59 138.17 158.58 
Henan 351.46 59.94 77.90 
Hubei 439.88 76.05 95.68 
Hunan 409.18 54.21 90.40 
Guangdong 1 657.45 293.79 522.76 
Guangxi 422.47 59.07 98.65 
Hainan 633.18 78.51 198.17 
Chongqing 523.62 78.79 149.01 
Sichuan 390.02 55.28 102.99 
Guizhou 323.26 50.20 81.30 
Yunnan 528.75 89.38 103.23 
Tibet 335.66 34.66 148.65 
Shaanxi 484.16 85.75 138.35 
Gansu 341.66 69.61 92.46 
Qinghai 450.45 98.36 136.90 
Ningxia 517.53 86.89 187.75 
Xinjiang 663.05 130.23 206.06 
Mean 948.70 166.55 291.51 
Standard Deviation 1 142.79 192.57 444.14 
Coefficient of Variation 1.20 1.16 1.52 
Maximum 5 391.08 994.74 1 942.22 
Minimum 323.26 34.66 71.72 
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Table 5.8 Horizontal Revenue Disparities across Subnational 
Governments in 2003 (RMB Yuan per capita) (cont'd) 
Enterprises' 
Income Tax 
Individual 
Income Tax 
Tax on City 
Maint. & Const. 
Agricultural 
Tax 
Income from 
Admin. Fees 
643.37 392.82 198.12 4.47 124.44 
235.36 123.95 106.78 3.69 145.63 
42.38 26.81 27.73 38.15 43.48 
42.94 25.91 39.11 12.16 40.70 
30.09 22.81 29.28 33.87 51.70 
85.34 55.95 61.20 24.53 89.92 
43.63 28.88 34.50 45.24 55.50 
28.26 28.78 55.10 47.04 39.83 
854.18 419.71 208.16 0.69 133.24 
125.16 54.22 62.55 35.92 68.63 
227.62 97.85 90.12 11.64 43.43 
29.71 12.86 20.77 41.65 35.84 
105.52 60.94 39.91 14.03 61.48 
22.90 17.10 19.33 37.65 42.80 
72.81 28.52 48.66 59.64 83.00 
30.14 16.14 21.25 41.81 31.08 
35.57 19.13 28.95 43.12 40.55 
20.20 18.25 24.50 39.34 52.33 
213.75 119.14 60.03 11.76 110.20 
26.88 21.31 19.60 36.99 45.30 
32.13 34.30 33.86 49.15 58.29 
28.02 25.15 27.64 24.34 82.86 
28.45 16.50 23.68 26.40 48.61 
21.53 14.06 22.46 26.18 30.26 
49.13 19.16 53.90 56.83 28.33 
26.50 10.55 11.73 — 23.39 
34.68 18.57 33.29 29.42 27.82 
20.39 14.13 26.92 24.50 22.09 
22.81 14.67 29.01 14.51 23.36 
29.03 22.44 31.85 12.89 35.14 
26.91 32.81 49.05 22.57 50.62 
104.37 58.50 49.65 29.01 57.09 
184.39 97.41 46.01 15.94 33.06 
1.77 1.67 0.93 0.55 0.58 
854.18 419.71 208.16 59.64 145.63 
20.20 10.55 11.73 0.69 22.09 
Source: China Statistics Yearbook. 2003. Refer to notes for Table 5.5. 
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Table 5.9 Horizontal Expenditure Disparities across Subnational 
Governments in 2003 (RMB Yuan per capita) 
Region Total 
Capital 
Construction 
Technological 
Upgrading 
and R&DP 
Industry, 
Transport & 
Commerce1 
Region Total 1 333.30 147.53 63.81 15.53 
Beijing 5 045.35 494.28 358.75 30.03 
Tianjin 3 085.90 518.42 367.60 16.31 
Hebei 955.39 61.35 22.75 17.37 
Shanxi 1 254.23 111.24 29.54 15.87 
Inner Mongolia 1 879.54 328.34 74.66 18.50 
Liaoning 1 863.13 161.55 75.81 24.89 
Jilin 1 513.58 117.75 49.88 26.18 
Heilongjiang 1 480.75 101.62 48.53 28.13 
Shanghai 6 361.42 1 430.37 912.07 24.19 
Jiangsu 1 414.67 102.58 87.36 14.76 
Zhejiang 1 916.37 135.28 146.24 37.82 
Anhui 791.64 74.02 27.45 6.24 
Fujian 1 296.73 107.39 57.79 23.39 
Jiangxi 898.16 79.67 20.18 14.19 
Shandong 1 107.55 69.78 66.15 11.34 
Henan 741.28 51.99 23.18 7.00 
Hubei 900.47 51.19 30.94 10.25 
Hunan 861.12 77.14 22.65 11.63 
Guangdong 2 131.74 302.82 73.52 19.77 
Guangxi 913.33 82.35 32.02 7.07 
Hainan 1 300.38 165.90 9.62 8.02 
Chongqing 1 091.30 204.69 32.13 4.50 
Sichuan 841.68 86.22 33.77 9.05 
Guizhou 858.87 81.76 20.16 12.72 
Yunnan 1 342.32 161.13 50.85 18.58 
Tibet 5 400.50 2 199.90 21.60 116.03 
Shaanxi 1 133.49 125.36 33.20 24.98 
Gansu 1 152.39 126.74 29.44 9.72 
Qinghai 2 286.32 553.18 33.68 26.41 
Ningxia 1 822.84 350.79 81.37 22.88 
Xinjiang 1 905.26 330.89 26.20 16.75 
Mean 1 791.86 285.35 93.52 20.47 
Standard Deviation 1 384.07 443.30 173.65 19.50 
Coefficient of Variation 0.77 1.55 1.86 0.95 
Maximum 6 361.42 2 199.90 912.07 116.03 
Minimum 741.28 51.19 9.62 4.50 
Notes: 
a This is the sum of Expenditure for Innovation Enterprises and Expenditure for Science and 
Technology Promotion. 
b This is the sum of Expenditure for Operating Expenses of Department of Industry and 
Transportation and Expenditure for Operating Expenses of Department of Commerce, 
c This is the sum of Expenditure for Agriculture, Expenditure for Forestry, Expenditure for 
Operational Expenses of Agriculture, Forestry, Water Conservancy and Meteorology. 
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Table 5.9 Horizontal Expenditure Disparities across Subnational 
Governments in 2003 (RMB Yuan per capita) (cont'd) 
Culture, Social Government 
Educ., Relief & Adminis­ Price City 
Agriculture Science & Welfare tration Subsidies Maintenance 
Health1 
77.33 309.35 38.20 224.27 29.39 58.95 
179.77 1 205.96 156.77 655.82 30.83 248.24 
79.47 712.16 58.69 384.46 30.80 272.98 
45.14 256.47 28.08 170.72 31.95 31.37 
79.03 304.01 40.06 215.55 27.82 35.53 
149.39 351.61 46.00 288.78 83.39 77.91 
103.96 336.66 73.14 275.55 61.56 114.23 
80.48 304.74 59.28 210.33 153.63 43.94 
116.59 319.42 49.35 228.55 117.05 65.69 
138.75 1 146.19 90.60 643.43 5.90 261.48 
89.03 358.95 35.91 260.42 19.18 125.13 
127.91 522.29 38.61 371.99 11.06 127.38 
50.92 179.93 32.47 128.00 33.82 22.11 
77.80 377.46 27.64 206.53 19.69 36.93 
55.23 213.11 31.68 150.00 26.16 30.47 
67.74 279.82 30.82 196.63 21.31 75.09 
37.33 194.76 24.95 135.89 28.72 22.78 
47.26 215.63 41.94 157.20 25.73 29.81 
54.35 187.04 32.81 148.45 21.12 35.14 
120.70 493.02 38.29 434.71 15.68 79.83 
61.61 241.29 23.10 172.13 10.95 38.58 
86.55 273.15 38.31 214.20 17.11 43.72 
54.26 198.38 40.97 193.20 17.12 63.52 
55.84 186.15 29.27 169.04 17.77 27.80 
63.74 235.10 22.94 173.71 7.75 22.01 
111.96 329.07 39.43 215.39 9.76 41.53 
231.66 821.36 78.08 978.52 67.18 18.58 
78.80 262.80 42.13 195.91 14.38 41.41 
79.32 268.56 30.76 172.91 20.55 25.44 
140.28 390.90 66.43 308.84 21.30 22.65 
148.88 379.17 46.04 223.82 33.39 48.18 
119.95 422.94 59.96 310.52 50.63 49.94 
94.64 386.07 46.92 277.14 33.98 70.30 
44.65 256.20 26.35 183.36 32.55 69.92 
0.47 0.66 0.56 0.66 0.96 0.99 
231.66 1 205.96 156.77 978.52 153.63 272.98 
37.33 179.93 22.94 128.00 5.90 18.58 
d This is the sum of Expenditure for Operating Expenses of Departments of Culture, Sport & 
Broadcasting, Education, Department of Science and Expenditure for Public Health, 
e This is the sum of Expenditure for Government Administration, Expenditure for Foreign 
Affairs, Expenditure for Public Security Agency, Procuratorial Agency and Court of Justice. 
Source: China Statistics Yearbook, 2004. 
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The disparities in expenditures per capita (Table 5.9) are less 
pronounced than is the case for revenues per capita. For example the 
coefficient of variation for expenditures per capita across provinces for 
2003 is 0.77 (Table 5.9), which is considerably lower than that for revenues 
at 1.20 (Table 5.8). However, the disparities in expenditures per capita are 
still considerable. Budgetary expenditures per capita in 2003 were as high 
as RMB 6361 yuan in Shanghai and RMB 5045 yuan in Beijing and as low 
as RMB 741 yuan in Henan and RMB 791 yuan in Anhui provinces, 
representing more than an eight-fold difference between the best and worst-
off provinces. Two other features in the distribution of expenditures per 
capita in Table 5.9 are noticeable. First, there is a higher disparity in per 
capita expenditures in more discretionary items, such as capital construction 
and technology, than on more basic items, such as health, education and 
welfare. Thus, in a sense, disparities on the expenditure side may not be as 
pronounced as they appear in the aggregate figures. 
Second, Table 5.9 shows that per capita budgetary expenditures in 
relatively poor provinces such as Tibet and Gansu are higher than in 
provinces relatively richer in per capita GDP such as Hebei or Hunan. This 
is most pronounced for Tibet, which in 2003 had expenditures per capita in 
capital construction, for example, five times the average value for all 
provinces, and higher than in Shanghai and Beijing. 
All this reflects the fact that equalization transfers and poverty 
alleviation seem to be concentrated in the poorest provinces, leading to 
ranking reversals in terms of per capita income and expenditures, especially 
among the poorest and middle level provinces.29 These policies are likely 
to be demoralizing to those subnational governments that end up last despite 
their efforts (for example, note Hebei's steep drop in per capita expenditures 
relative to the national average). 
Whatever the reasons behind China's current horizontal disparities, it is 
quite clear that they need to be addressed through a well designed and 
effective system of transfers. 
An Overview of the Current Transfer System30 
Under the current TSS framework, there are three types of general grants 
from the central government to subnational governments: (i) the tax rebate; 
(ii) general purpose unconditional grants; and (iii) special purpose or 
conditional grants. With data for 2000, from a total amount of RMB 405.8 
billion yuan of central government grants to subnational governments, the 
tax rebate transfer was by far the largest, representing 54 per cent of the 
total. General purpose grants and specific purpose grants represented 21 and 
22 per cent of the total, respectively.3' 
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The tax rebate was the result of a compromise in the design of the TSS 
reform, which grandfathered the vested interests of local governments prior 
to the 1994 reform. In essence, the tax rebate sends back to the provinces 
the amount of VAT and excise taxes that otherwise would have gone to the 
subnational governments had the tax assignments prevailing under the 
contracting system (prior to the 1994 TSS reform) remained in place and 
remitted in accordance with the derivation principle. The goal of the tax 
rebate was to smooth out opposition or other difficulties and ensure the 
smooth implementation of the 1994 reform. The significance of the tax 
rebate transfer is the highly un-equalizing impact it has on horizontal fiscal 
disparities, since a disproportionate share of these funds goes to the richer 
subnational governments. 
The general purpose grants include different forms of unconditional use 
funds and revenue sharing, and only a small share of all unconditional 
grants, about 10 per cent (or just about 2 per cent of all transfers) in 2000, 
were explicitly designed to serve as an equalization grant. However, as we 
see immediately below, many of the other general purpose grants also 
pursue equalization objectives. The special purpose grants consist of many 
different types of conditional transfers, often designed as matching 
transfers, and administered by line ministries and other central government 
agencies in the pursuit of all kinds of sectoral policy objectives. 
Equalization Grants 
Unlike many other countries, China does not have an explicit equalization 
grant system. Rather, the equalization grant system in China involves a 
number of different grants which have been designed with equalization 
features. These grants include: (a) the transitory period grants; (b) the 
pre-tax sharing system grants; (c) the equalization grants for minority 
regions; (d) the grants for covering the increased wages of civil servants and 
(e) a number of other smaller grants. 
Transitory period grants. These grants were introduced in 1995 as a 
complementary measure to the 1994 TSS reform.32 Their total amount is 
determined by the central government, on an ad hoc basis considering 
budgetary demands every year and distributed according to a formula that 
takes into account 'standard revenues and expenditure'. In 2001, these 
grants amounted to RMB 13.8 billion yuan. There is a question of whether 
these grants will be the vehicle for the implementation of a more ambitious 
equalization program by China's government in the future. They currently 
represent just a tiny amount of what the provinces receive, for example, 
with the tax rebate transfers. 
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Pre-tax sharing system grants. These grants are the fixed grants that 
existed under the 'contracted fiscal system' before the 1994 TSS reform. 
Under the 'contracted fiscal system', whether a province had to transfer 
resources to the central government or received grants depended on the gap 
between its revenues and expenditures measured in the base year. Despite 
the methodological problems involved, it is quite likely that the pre-TSS 
grants were strongly equalizing. At present there are about 16 provinces 
receiving these grants, mostly the central and west regions of the country, 
which are poorer in terms of income per capita.33 In size, these transfers are 
less than 1 per cent of all transfers. 
Grants to minority regions. The central government established an 
equalization grant system specifically geared to the 'minority regions' in 
2000.34 In the initial year the funding was RMB 1 billion yuan and this 
amount grows with a percentage (80 per cent) of the growth in VAT 
collections in the regions. The total amount distributed in 2001 was RMB 
3.3 billion yuan. 
Grants for increasing the standard wages of civil servants. These grants 
were designed to support the poorer provinces in the central and western 
parts of the country with the implementation of policies for increasing the 
standard wages of civil servants mandated by the central government. 
Without this assistance many of these provinces would have faced serious 
fiscal difficulties complying with the wage mandate.35 
As in the case of central province relations, the provincial governments 
also implement several forms of grants that pursue an equalization 
objective.36 These include pre-tax sharing system grants, transitory period 
grants, compensation for wage increases, and others. These grants at the 
provincial level follow the structure of central government grants, but 
frequently the upper-level governments attach some type of conditionality. 
Main Challenges with the Current System of Equalization Transfers 
China's current equalization transfer system scores well in some areas but it 
fails in other fundamental areas. The system should be the first priority for 
reform, but in conjunction with other intergovernmental finance reforms. 
What is being done right? Most transfers that have an equalization 
motive take into account lower tax capacity and greater expenditure needs 
of local governments in some sort of formula. Practically all of these 
transfers at the central level are unconditional or lump-sum grants. 
In terms of problems, clearly the equalization grant system is too 
complex. Up until now, the central government has established nine 
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equalization grants. By comparison, most countries with decentralized 
systems of public finance have only one equalization grant. The complexity 
of the system also has to do with how those grants are structured. In 
addition, the determination of the pool of funds is in some cases uncertain, 
and the grants are severely underfunded relative to the growing problems of 
horizontal fiscal disparities 
There has been, in addition, a tendency at the central level toward the 
buttressing of specific purpose grants to the detriment of unconditional 
equalization grants. Often in recent years, whenever the central government 
has introduced an important policy toward subnational governments, it has 
also invariably established an earmarked grant to match that policy, leaving 
fewer funds available for the equalization grants. 
One last point is that the effectiveness of China's equalization system is 
likely compromised because of the strong federalist features in the current 
vertical structure of government. As we have seen, provinces can largely 
decide how to arrange their fiscal affairs with cities and prefectures, and 
these latter with counties, and so on. Often, it would appear that provincial 
and prefecture-level governments do not allocate enough funds within then-
budgets for equalization purposes, perhaps following the path indicated by 
the central authorities. In some cases the provincial governments appear to 
have retained funds from central grants that were intended for counties and 
townships. In this sense subnational equalization grants have not played the 
necessary supporting role in reducing fiscal disparities. Discretion among 
subnational governments regarding how they want to organize their 
intergovernmental fiscal relations reduces the ability of the central 
government to implement its own policies and achieve its own objectives. 
Some recent reform initiatives for the transfer system appear to go in the 
right direction but still fall short. For example the central authorities have 
been re-examining specific purpose grants and some have been converted 
into equalization grants.37 A second initiative has been to design specific 
regulations to enhance the effectiveness of central government policies at 
the subnational level, which so far has not materialized. There is also a 
move to increase the pool of funds available for equalization, as in the case 
of the new sharing arrangements between the center and subnational 
governments in the PIT and EIT. In 2002 another RMB 10 billion yuan 
were added to the equalization grants pool from those sources. The overall 
thrust for reform in this area should be to make the system of equalization 
grants simpler and more transparent. 
Besides strengthening the equalization grant system, there are other 
policies that may be even more successful in addressing horizontal fiscal 
disparities.38 Liberalizing the internal migration regulations, in particular the 
residence registration system or Hukou, should relieve fiscal pressures on 
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the poorer local governments in the central and western provinces (from 
unemployment, poverty, and demand for basic services). Liberalizing the 
financing system should also help income convergence among China's 
provinces. China's financial system, through the role of the monopoly state 
banking system, has historically subsidized the richer provinces where there 
has been a higher concentration of SOEs. The more recent liberalization of 
foreign direct investment to all provinces in China, and not just to a few 
richer provinces in the eastern part of the country, should also help the 
convergence process. 
FISCAL MANAGEMENT AND BUDGETARY 
AUTONOMY 
The entire budget process at the central and subnational government levels 
in China is still based on the 1994 Budget Law and its implementing 
regulations. With the passage of time and the rapid developments in so 
many areas of public governance, the Budget Law has become obsolete and 
inadequate for the needs of local governments. As a precursor to budget 
reform at the national level, since the early 1990s the budget process at the 
local level has undergone several important reform initiatives. These 
include the adoption of a 'zero-based' budgeting approach with the 
objective of better prioritizing the use of available resources; and an effort 
to decrease the importance of extra-budgetary funds by converting fees and 
charges into taxes and bringing the funds into fiscal accounts. 
Nevertheless, despite these recent reforms, the budget process at the 
local level in China still presents serious problems. The efficiency of 
subnational expenditures is low, with severe overstaffing and too many 
agencies and organizations. There is a predominance of input budgeting, 
and a central planning mentality still reigns in budget bureaus - for 
example, there is an emphasis on new buildings rather than on facilitating 
access and using existing resources better. 
Budgetary autonomy to prioritize expenditures and choose the optimal 
combination of inputs for service delivery is limited in several important 
ways. Progress has been slow in bringing extra-budgetary funds into the 
regular budget, and the structure of local budgets remains fragmented, with 
extra-budget and off-budget funds representing in many cases half of all 
local budgets. Budget classification is still not presented in a way that 
conveys information on the use of resources and objectives of spending 
programs to facilitate the decision-making process. The approval of 
budgets, despite recent government efforts, continues to take place too late 
in the year. For these reasons budgets sometimes are just ex-post financial 
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statements. In addition, controls over budget execution remain weak as the 
treasury reforms make slow progress, ex-post external audit is still in the 
development stage, and budget evaluation practices are practically 
non-existent. 
The ongoing reforms of the budget process at the subnational level 
exhibit two major weaknesses. First, the reforms lack adequate scope: the 
current problems the local budget process presents, as discussed below, go 
well beyond those being addressed by the current reforms. Second, the 
reforms lack comprehensiveness: the current piecemeal approach fails to 
capture the interrelationships and dependencies that exist among the 
different stages of the budget process. This piecemeal approach to 
budgetary reform in China compares unfavorably with the reforms taken or 
those under way in other transitional countries (Russia and other transitional 
countries in the Former Soviet Union and Central and Eastern Europe).39 
Reforming the budget process at the local level in China is important 
because budget procedures and institutions are key determinants of the 
overall level of efficiency in the delivery of public services to citizens. 
Increasing efficiency in the delivery of public services requires both an 
explicit statement of budget priorities and budget institutions that are 
effective in implementing those policy priorities. A clear statement of 
priorities requires in turn a budget approach that ensures the simultaneous 
prioritization of all government activities, on and off budget. The effective 
implementation of budget priorities requires budget institutions that provide 
clear positive incentives as well as penalties so that spending agencies 
adhere to the stated priorities during budget execution. 
How Much Budgetary Autonomy Exists at the Local Level? 
As a unitary country, China delegates all budget authority from the central 
government level. However, even within a unitary state, realizing the 
benefits of decentralization is only possible if there is an adequate degree of 
budgetary autonomy at the local level. The exercise of budgetary autonomy 
at the local level has several dimensions. 
First, budgetary autonomy at the local level requires that local 
governments be able to prepare their own budgets separately from the 
budget of the central government and any other upper-level government. 
This requires that local governments be able to approve their own budgets 
even if the upper-level government fails to approve its budget on time. If 
part of the funds comes from the upper-level government, as in the case of 
tax sharing and transfers, these funds must be determined by fixed and 
stable rules in the case of revenue sharing and by formula in the case of 
transfers. In this regard, earmarked funds that are allocated on an ad hoc 
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basis by higher levels hinder local budgeting (especially when they require 
matching funds) unless they are made well in advance of the budget year. 
In China, the budget processes at the five levels of government remain 
hierarchically interlinked. Provincial budgets cannot be formulated and 
approved until the central government budget is approved. Similarly, the 
budgets of prefectures and cities cannot be approved until the provincial 
budget is approved, and so on. The late approval of the central government 
budget traditionally started a chain reaction, which led to many local 
government budgets being approved very late in the year. 
Second, local governments need to be able to increase and decrease the 
size of their budgets through the exercise of an adequate degree of tax 
autonomy. As discussed in the presentation of revenue assignments above, 
at the present time, there is in China practically no autonomy at the local 
level to raise revenues at the margin. 
Third, local governments require sufficient stability and predictability of 
revenues and expenditures. The 1994 TSS reform introduced stability and 
certainty in revenue assignments for provincial governments, but, as noted 
above, there is no formal revenue assignment at the sub-provincial level, 
and the system is still evolving. The current system of transfers, rebates, and 
withdrawals is still changed with high frequency by upper-level 
governments, and there is still an element of the negotiated (and uncertain) 
system that prevailed prior to 1994. The requirement of hefty matching 
contributions for many earmarked but undefined transfers by upper-level 
governments often forces lower-level governments to maintain substantial 
reserves of funds until the earmarked funds and the matching conditions are 
made known. 
Fourth, local governments need discretion to use their resources, or most 
of them, according to their own priorities and the freedom to deliver public 
services using the production techniques and combinations of inputs they 
consider to be most cost efficient. The current budget practice performs 
much better in this dimension, but currently there is a long list of laws and 
regulations local governments must take into account in the formulation of 
their budgets.40 However, few local governments actually appear to comply 
with all these laws and regulations. 
A source of more serious concern is the fact that budgetary discretion is 
undermined by the flow of unfunded mandates from the central 
government. The most important of these mandates is the setting of wages 
for local civil servants by the central authorities.41 This lack of flexibility 
detracts from the ability of local governments to keep more able employees 
or to take advantage of local labor market conditions. In practice, in at least 
some provinces, county governments are burdened with the requirements to 
hire recent college and high school graduates, in effect working as 
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employers of last resort. Discretion on how to spend resources to minimize 
the costs of delivering public services is further diminished by the fact that 
the Committee for Public Service and the Personnel Bureau also determine 
staffing levels for all agencies. To add to the damage, at the spending unit 
level, managers have little incentive to save in personnel because this 
budget item is budgeted separately. Saving in personnel simply means 
foregoing the budget allocation. Indeed, in times of uncertain and unstable 
transfers, the only certainty local governments can count on is the 
commitment to pay salaries. It should not come as a surprise, therefore, that 
budget expenditures are still loaded up with wages and salaries, as local 
governments have moved other (more discretionary) spending off budget. 
For poor regions, it appears that adding staff is often the only mechanism 
for getting more transfers from higher levels. Increasing budgetary 
autonomy and discretion in decision-making will require controlling the 
practice of unfunded mandates. But, to extrapolate from international 
experience, it may not be sufficient to prohibit them by law. What will be 
required in addition is the exercise of legislative restraint at the central 
government level as well as several other measures.42 Granting local 
governments increased powers for hiring and firing is also required, for the 
determination of optimal staffing levels, and for wage setting. 
Extra-Budgetary Funds and Other Budget Issues 
Budgets represent the most significant fiscal policy instrument in the hands 
of government and therefore need to provide complete information to 
policy-makers and convey clear information on policy objectives. The 
current budget structure at the local level in China does neither. 
An important problem is the presence of extra-budgetary and off-budget 
funds. However, their relative importance has been in decline for a number 
of years. Prior to the 1994 TSS reform, at the height of the 'contracting 
system', extra-budgetary funds represented as much as 80 per cent of 
subnational total resources. The current policy has been to convert fees and 
charges for extra-budgetary funds into taxes feeding directly into the regular 
budget, and extra-budgetary funds are now estimated to represent less than 
20 per cent of the resources available to subnational governments. Still, this 
practice violates the principles of completeness and comprehensiveness of 
public budgets. The fragmentation in decision-making represented by 
extra-budgetary funds does not allow proper prioritization in the use of 
available resources. With the exception of some cost recovery fees for 
self-sustaining activities, there is no reason for the existence of 
extra-budgetary funds at the local level in China. But, as we have seen, 
there are plenty of explanations for the presence of these funds that must be 
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addressed if reform is to occur. 
Traditionally, budget formulation in China has been input-oriented, 
building incrementally on the resource allocations of past years without 
focusing on goals, outcomes or performance. This approach made it 
difficult to properly prioritize public expenditures. The ongoing reforms 
have adopted a 'zero-based budgeting' approach as the vehicle to force 
budget officials to break with the budgetary inertia of the past and prioritize 
public expenditures. However, none of the levels of government is truly 
practicing or plans to introduce a rigorous version of zero-based budgeting. 
Most notable is the fact that wages and salaries, which in some local 
governments reach over 70 per cent of the budget, are not included in the 
'zero-budgeting' exercise. In addition, upper-level governments are still 
virtually in charge of approving the budgets of lower-level governments. 
There are several budget activities that currently go unreported and 
which also escape regular budget scrutiny. The first is the granting of tax 
incentives and other favorable tax treatment to particular activities or 
enterprises. Although the central authorities have tried to prohibit the 
practice, local governments have provided and continue to provide tax 
incentives, primarily to encourage economic development. Local 
governments also provide hidden and soft loans to enterprises, and in some 
cases government loan guarantees. These represent direct use of budget 
resources or hidden liabilities. Requiring governments to explicitly report 
these activities will increase the transparency of local budgets. 
Traditionally the budget departments or finance bureaus at the local 
level have not distinguished between budget execution and budget 
formulation, on the one hand, and internal audit or budget control, on the 
other hand. The lack of personnel specialization in many provinces 
continues to create inefficiencies and conflicts of interest, in particular in 
audit and control. This problem, and others related to the slow disbursement 
of funds, will become less of an issue as the introduction of a modern 
treasury function at the local level progresses. A second set of problems in 
budget execution has to do with the lack of formal discretion in budget 
execution and the lack of institutions and tradition to hold budget managers 
accountable for results. Theoretically, budget managers have no discretion 
at all since the Budget Law requires the previous approval of the local 
Finance Bureau for the reallocation of any amount of funds. However, it 
appears that in practice the virement of non-personal resources is a common 
practice in the process of budget execution. This is a bad combination. 
Formally providing some degree of budget flexibility and holding managers 
accountable for the results would be a superior arrangement. The lack of 
formal flexibility is most damaging to the efficient use of resources in the 
personnel area. Local governments have to hire staff according to the rules 
China's long march to decentralization 129 
and mandates of the Employment Bureau. It is not certain how compulsory 
these orders are, although it does appear that some local governments 
follow them to the letter. This lack of flexibility has led to paradoxical 
situations in which, for example, health facilities are overstaffed but also 
have a shortage of specialized personnel. 
The weakest link in China's budget process is external ex-post audit and 
general oversight over budget performance. The purpose of external ex-post 
audit is to examine after the close of the fiscal year the correct use of funds 
by the executive branch and other organs of government. This function 
needs to be carried out externally or independently of the spending units in 
the executive branch. The external audit unit may respond to the legislative 
branch of government or be an independent institution. External ex-post 
institutions at the local level in China meet only some of the requisite 
features. In China, the local 'audit bureaus' carry out the ex-post audit of 
the final account of last year's local budget. However, even though local 
audit bureaus also report to the People's Congress, they are under the direct 
authority of the executive branch of government. Budget evaluation with a 
focus on performance and budget outcomes does not yet exist in China. 
CONCLUSION 
China's approach to intergovernmental fiscal relations reforms has been 
gradual and measured. This type of approach has had the advantages of 
avoiding major disruptions and increasing acceptance by subnational 
governments. But China's incremental piecemeal reform efforts have also 
had some serious drawbacks. For example, we have seen that the most 
recent major reform, the Tax Sharing System of 1994, addressed problems 
of revenue assignments and tax administration, but left other key pieces of 
the intergovernmental system untouched, most notably expenditure 
assignments. The result is that the current system is full of conflicts and 
contradictions, and performs poorly on efficiency and equity grounds. 
Examples of these contradictions abound.43 For example, the lack of 
adequate revenue sources at the subnational level has led the central 
government to the use of ad hoc earmarked subsidies to subnational 
governments, with the amounts determined ex-post, based on the 
availability of funds. While these subsidies provide short-term relief, they 
also have some harmful effects in the longer term. The lack of predictability 
and stability creates uncertainty among local governments and is inimical to 
the goal of transparent and predictable local budgets. On the tax side, 
piecemeal measures such as the partial re-centralization of the enterprise 
income tax and the personal income tax do nothing to address the current 
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distortions in revenue assignments, associated with the rather arbitrary 
sharing of the VAT and the heavy reliance by subnational governments on 
the 'business (turnover) tax'. The system of intergovernmental fiscal 
relations is extraordinarily complex and non-transparent, with overlays of 
remnants of past systems. It is also widely regarded as unfair and 
unreliable, subject to change at the discretion of higher levels. 
The main problem with intergovernmental reform in China has been the 
lack of a comprehensive blueprint or strategy suggesting explicit goals for 
decentralization and how the different elements of the system will link with 
each other in arriving at those goals. Developing such a strategy is 
complicated and perhaps it has not been politically feasible. For example, 
China's fiscal decentralization reform continues to be conditioned by 
success in tax policy and tax administration reform and it involves 
problematic self-government political issues. Or perhaps there has been a 
perception that a comprehensive strategy would necessarily require an 
all-at-once or 'big bang' implementation of the strategy. This could not be 
further from the truth. Implementation of the reform strategy can be gradual 
and lessons learned along the way can be incorporated into the overall 
strategy. But even though the reform process has been gradual, it has been 
extremely slow in internalizing lessons. 
Given the remarkable growth of China over the last decade, more 
aggressive equalization policies may have been expected from the central 
government, but it has only been recently that fiscal reforms have paid 
attention to this issue.44 Of course, redistributional policies always require a 
high level of national consensus, even in countries like China with a single 
party regime, and this consensus may not have been there, given the 
pressure exercised by the richer coastal provinces in Beijing defending their 
own interests. The challenge of how to turn around growing fiscal 
disparities will be helped by addressing other policies outside the fiscal 
domain. These include the reform of internal migration, the reform of the 
financial system and the distribution of financial resources, and generally 
the extension of the benefits of globalization beyond the eastern region to 
the rest of the country. 
Other important challenges include the reform of expenditure 
assignments, providing subnational governments with adequate revenue 
autonomy, simplifying and strengthening the transfer system, allowing 
responsible borrowing, and civil service reform. In the area of expenditure 
assignments in particular, there is a need to re-centralize most of the 
responsibilities for social welfare and the safety net, including pension 
systems, unemployment compensation, and health insurance.45 Providing 
subnational governments with more revenue autonomy will require parallel 
reform efforts in tax policy and tax administration. The personal income tax 
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and property taxes are the best vehicles to provide autonomy for the 
provincial and local governments. Centralizing VAT revenues would not 
only help address the now-unfair apportionment of this tax but would also 
enable the central governments to fund a more aggressive equalization 
policy. The prohibition of subnational government borrowing should be 
carefully lifted. Local governments are already borrowing for capital 
expenditures. It would be better for the borrowing to be more transparent to 
facilitate monitoring and regulation. 
Improving public sector performance at the subnational level will 
require progressive reform of the civil service system. The starting point 
should be to allow subnational governments to provide better pay incentives 
and to eliminate the uniform national wage scale, which has been distorting, 
impractical and financially troublesome to many subnational governments. 
The last step would be to allow free hiring and firing and the elimination of 
the personnel establishment system for subnational governments. The 
hardest challenge of all will be to seek ways of increasing subnational 
government responsiveness to citizens' needs and preferences by ultimately 
allowing freely contested elections. 
NOTES 
1. Some sections of this chapter update and draw upon recent work by the author in World 
Bank (2002) and joint work in Wong and Martinez-Vazquez (2002) and Zhang and 
Martinez-Vazquez (2003). I am thankful to Li Zhang for her very able assistance and to 
Christine Wong for comments and feedback on earlier drafts of some of the material in 
this chapter. 
2. At this level there are actually 22 provinces, five autonomous regions and four cities with 
provincial status (Beijing, Shanghai, Tianjin and Chongqing). 
3. One major implication of the lack of democratic representation is the diminished 
accountability of- local officials to local residents and the incentives for them to 
concentrate on fulfilling the wishes of the central authorities. See Bahl and Martinez-
Vazquez (2005). 
4. China's fiscal system during this period was very similar to those in the centrally planned 
economies of Central and Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union. See Martinez-
Vazquez and McNab (2000). 
5. However, fairness and equal treatment were difficult to achieve. The perception was 
often that richer more developed provinces on the eastern coast were sometimes able to 
get preferable terms vis-4-vis poorer inland provinces. 
6. See for example the discussion in Wong (1991, 1992). 
7. The lower profitability of SOEs due to the transition to market prices and competition 
from non-state/private enterprises also had a role in the decline in tax revenues. In 
addition the new economic environment of the market transition with many more 
taxpayers and economic activities likely contributed to tax enforcement problems. 
8. See Bahl (1998 and 1999b) for an in-depth discussion of the different aspects of TSS 
reform. 
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9. For example, the State Council Supplementary Regulations on the Implementation of the 
TSS of 1994 have a brief description of local governments' main expenditure 
responsibilities. 
10. It is important to keep in mind throughout the discussion of the data that we will be 
discussing official budget data and that we will not cover expenditure data from 
off-budget and extra-budgetary funds. 
11. The data are for the central and consolidated subnational levels. At present, information 
on the breakdown of expenditures among the levels of subnational governments is 
available only on a province-by-province basis. See World Bank (2002) for a survey of 
four provinces. 
12. This reflects the fact that subnational governments are not allowed to borrow. 
13. The high frequency of concurrent assignments in China may be interpreted as a legacy of 
the Maoist economy, when divisions of responsibility were unimportant as every unit 
strove to be self-reliant. 
14. Aside from those financed at the four provincial-level cities of Beijing, Shanghai, Tianjin 
and Chongqing. 
15. For centrally owned enterprises, the EIT still accrues to the central government. Also, 
some of the personal income tax in recent years has gone to the central government to 
fund transfers to poorer inland provinces. 
16. New central taxes include the income tax on savings deposits and the vehicle purchase 
tax. Other reapportionments include the sharing rates on the business tax levied on banks, 
and the stock market trading tax. 
17. Some enterprises including banks, China Gas Company and China Oil and Chemistry 
Company were excluded from these sharing arrangements. 
18. This is a gross receipts tax falling mainly on service sectors not covered by the VAT. See 
Table 5.1. 
19. This partly reflects the effort of the central authorities to force subnational governments 
to get rid of (or transform) the numerous illegal fees that have been used in the past. 
20. There are 12 provinces in this group: Shanghai, Tianjin, Beijing, Chongqing, Hebei, 
Shanxi, Inner Mongolia, Shandong, Sichuan, Xinjiang, Zhejiang and Hainan. 
21. The eleven provinces in this group are Hunan, Hubei, Jiangxi, Guangdong, Guangxi, 
Qingha, Henan, Liaoning, Anhui, Yunnan and Tibet. 
22. The eight provinces in this group are Gansu, Jiangsu, Fujian, Guizhou, Ningxia, Jilin, 
Heilongjiang and Shaanxi. 
23. This term is coined in Bahl (1999a). 
24. Although they are said to be big, there are no published data on the extra-budgetary 
funds. Ahmad et al. (2000) reported that extra-budgetary funds represented close to 40 
per cent of all revenues at the local level in 1999. See Wong (1999) for a discussion of 
the important role of extra-budgetary funds in China. 
25. The sharing of the VAT on a derivation basis is in fact equivalent to a provincial VAT 
system on an origin basis - the VAT is levied where production takes place, but with 
completely harmonized bases and rates as defined in the national law. An implication of 
this type of tax is to provide incentives for protectionist policies. 
26. A third alternative may be the creation of a dual system with central and regional VATs 
(see Ebril et al., 2002). But given the poor enforcement of the central VAT (Bin, 2000), it 
is doubtful that this is a viable option for China at present. 
27. See the discussion on the personal income tax potential for China in World Bank (2002). 
28. There are seven kinds of taxes concerning land and property in China: Business Tax, 
Urban and Township Land Use Tax, House Property Tax, Urban Real Estate Tax, Farm 
Land Occupation Tax, Land Appreciation Tax and Deed Tax. See Wang and Xu (2004). 
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29. This issue has been raised previously in Wong (1997), Bernstein and Lu (2001) and 
Riskin et al. (2001). 
30. See Zhang and Martinez-Vazquez (2003) for a full discussion. The description here is 
based on that work. 
31. Data on the composition of grants are not available in the Statistical Yearbook and can 
only be obtained from the Ministry of Finance, which explains why we only have data for 
several years ago. 
32. The denomination of 'transitory period' is based on the fact that Ministry of Finance 
officials responsible for their design appear to have felt tentative about the formula and 
impact. A political motive may have been involved also to reduce subnational 
expectations about the size and impact of these grants. 
33. The largest amounts go to Tibet and Inner Mongolia. 
34. Minority regions consist of eight provinces and eight minority prefectures located in non-
minority provinces in 2000. 
35. The central government decided to increase wages starting 1 July 1999 by an amount of 
RMB 120 per capita each month. During 2001, there were four wage increases. 
Complementing these four policy decisions, the central government established four 
types of grants. However, in addition, the central government also established a system of 
grants specifically designed to help provinces facing fiscal difficulties to pay the wages 
of teachers in elementary and middle schools in rural areas. 
36. As we discussed above, some provinces share the tax rebate quite fully with local 
government and others hardly at all. In addition, all provinces implement special purpose 
grants with their local governments. The system is hierarchically replicated down the 
vertical structure of local governments in different forms. 
37. For example, about RMB 4 billion of subsidies for food in urban areas were transferred 
into the transitory equalization grants in 2001. The same was done with earmarked grants 
for the development of border regions. 
38. See Bahl and Martinez-Vazquez (2005) for a discussion of how other central government 
policies may have affected interregional income and fiscal disparities. 
39. See Martinez-Vazquez and Boex (2001) for a review of fiscal management and budgeting 
reform in transitional countries. 
40. For other laws and regulations, it is unclear which are compulsory and which can be 
simply taken as general working principles and guidelines for budget formulation. 
41. There have been numerous rounds of pay increases for civil servants over the past few 
years, including the associated increases in pension benefits. This has brought many poor 
local governments to the brink. In response, the central government has been 
implementing a set of specialized transfers to help the poorer local governments meet 
their payroll obligations. Unfunded mandates also arise from entitlements in central 
government laws, such as access to free basic education in the Law on Education. 
42. These measures could include the creation of a watchdog committee at the National 
Peoples' Congress to review ex-ante draft legislation for the existence of unfunded 
mandates, the creation of an intergovernmental permanent commission with broad 
representation to evaluate ex-post the appearance of mandates, increasing the clarity and 
transparency of the assignment of expenditure responsibilities, especially in those areas 
where there are concurrent responsibilities. 
43. Sec Wong and Martinez-Vazquez (2002). 
44. On the potential policy tradeoff between economic growth and regional fiscal 
equalization, the central government appears to have chosen the side of economic growth. 
See Qiao et al. (2002). 
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45. The process got started recently with the creation of the National Social Security Fund by 
the central government. 
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